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Abstract—We consider the problem of secure communication
over a network in the presence of wiretappers. We give a new
cut-set bound on secrecy capacity which takes into account the
contribution of both forward and backward edges crossing the
cut, and the connectivity between their endpoints in the rest of
the network. We show the bound is tight on a class of networks,
which demonstrates that it is not possible to find a tighter bound
by considering only cut set edges and their connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a noise free communication network in which an
information source S wants to transmit a secret message to the
destination D over the network in the presence of a wiretapper
who can eavesdrop a subset of edges. The secure network
coding problem, introduced by Cai and Yeung [1], studies the
secrecy capacity of such networks. Under the assumptions that
1) all edges have unit capacity; 2) the wiretapper can eavesdrop
any subset of edges of size up to z; 3) only S has the ability
to generate randomness, [1] shows that the secrecy capacity is
x−z, where x is the min-cut from S to D. Subsequent works
have studied various ways to achieve this capacity with codes
on fields of smaller size [2], coset codes [3], and universal
codes [4].
Though the secrecy capacity is well understood in this
special case, much less is known under a more general setting.
In particular, if either edge capacities are not uniform, or the
collection of possible wiretap sets is more general (i.e., not
characterized by a simple parameter z), Cui et al. [5] show
that finding the secrecy capacity is NP-hard. On the other
hand, if randomness is allowed to be generated at non-source
nodes, Cai and Yeung [6] give an example in which this
can be advantageous, and provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for a linear network code to be secure. However,
for this case [7], [8] show that finding the secrecy capacity
is at least as difficult as the long-standing open problem of
determining the capacity region of multiple-unicast network
coding. To the best of our knowledge, under these general
settings, the only known bounds of secrecy capacity are
given implicitly in terms of entropy functions/entropic region
[9], [10], whereas determining the entropic region is a long
standing open problem as well.
This paper gives the first explicit upper bound on secrecy
capacity for the secure network coding problem in the case
where non-source nodes can generate randomness. Our bound
is based on cut-sets and has an intuitive graph-theoretic
interpretation. The key observation is that unlike traditional
cut-set bounds which only consider forward edges, for the
secure network coding problem backward edges may also be
helpful in a cut if down-stream (hence non-source) nodes
can generate randomness, as shown in Fig. 1-(a). Here the
backward edge (A,S) can transmit a random key back to
the source to protect the message, and enable secrecy rate
1 to be achieved. However, one should be careful in counting
the contribution of backward edges since they are not always
useful, such as edge (D,A) in Fig. 1-(b). Notice that the
networks of (a) and (b) are identical from the perspective
of cuts because they each contain a cut with two forward
edges and a cut with one forward edge and one backward
edge. Hence to avoid a loose bound we have to see beyond
the cut: in this simple example the backward edge in (a) is
helpful because it is connected to the forward edge, while the
one in (b) is not. More generally, this motivates us to take
into account the connectivity from backward edges to forward
edges, described by a 0-1 connectivity matrix C. We show
that the rank structure of the submatrices of C characterizes
the utility of the backward edges, and use this to obtain an
upper bound on secure capacity.
(a) Backward edge helpful (b) Not helpful
Fig. 1: Networks with unit capacity edges and z = 1.
Finally we show that given any network cut, we can con-
struct a network with the same cut set edges and connectivity
between their endpoints, such that our bound is achievable by
random scalar linear codes. Hence the bound is optimal in the
sense that it is not possible to find a better bound by merely
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considering the cut set edges and their connectivity.
II. MODELS
Consider a directed network G = (V, E) and let A ⊂ 2E
be a collection of wiretap sets. Since A is arbitrary (i.e., non-
unform), without loss of generality we may assume all edges
have unit capacity, because any edge of larger capacity can be
replaced by a number of parallel unit capacity edges in both
G and A. In this work we focus on the single source single
terminal setting. This seemingly simple setting is as at least
as hard as determining the capacity region of multiple unicast
network coding [7]. Let S be the source and D be the sink,
S wants to deliver a secret message M to D under perfect
secrecy with respect to A, i.e., denote X(A) as the signals
transmitted on A ⊂ E , then ∀A ∈ A, I(M ;X(A)) = 0. For
all i ∈ V , denote by Ki the independent randomness generated
at node i that might be used as keys to protect the message.
Consider an arbitrary cut V ⊂ V such that S ∈ V and
D ∈ V c. Denote EfwdV = {(i, j) ∈ E : i ∈ V, j ∈ V c}
as the set of forward edges with respect to V , and EbwdV =
{(i, j) ∈ E : i ∈ V c, j ∈ V } as the set of backward edges.
Assume |EfwdV | = x and |EbwdV | = y, we denote the x forward
edges by efwd1 , e
fwd
2 , ..., e
fwd
x , and the y backward edges by
ebwd1 , e
bwd
2 , ..., e
bwd
y . Let Cb→f = (c
′
ij) be an x×y (0-1) matrix
characterizing the connectivity from the backward edges to the
forward edges. More precisely,
c′ij =
 1
if ∃ a directed path from head(ebwdj ) to tail(efwdi )
that does not pass through any nodes in V c
0 otherwise
III. CUT-SET BOUND
This section gives a cut-set bound of the secure capacity
with respect to the cut V and its connectivity matrix Cb→f .
We first prove a lemma before formally introducing the bound.
Lemma 1. Given an arbitrary (0-1) matrix C = (cij) of size
a× b and U a collection of submatrices of C, there is a large
enough q such that there exists a matrix C¯ ∈ Fa×bq = (c¯ij)
with following properties: 1) c¯ij = 0 if cij = 0; 2) ∀ U ∈ U ,
assume its size is m×n and let the corresponding submatrix of
C¯ be U¯ , then rank(U¯) = maxV ∈Fm×nq ,vij=0 if uij=0 rank(V ),
i.e., U¯ is rank maximized subject to the zero constraints given
in C. In particular, q > |U|ab is sufficient.
Proof: Consider a finite field Fq of order q, and any U ∈
U , let
V¯ = arg max
V ∈Fm×nq ,vij=0 if uij=0
rank(V ),
and let rU = rank(V¯ ). So V¯ contains an rU × rU full rank
submatrix, denoted by V . Let C = (cij) be the submatrix
of C corresponding to the position of V . Now consider a
polynomial matrix V [x] = (vij) defined by
vij =
{
0 if cij = 0
xij if cij = 1
where the xij’s are indeterminates. Then it follows that
det(V [x]) is not the zero polynomial because otherwise
det(V ) = 0 and V cannot be full rank. Now let the non-zero
entries of V [x], i.e., all the xij’s, be i.i.d. uniformly distributed
on Fq . By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma,
Pr {det(V [x]) = 0} ≤ r
2
U
q
≤ ab
q
Notice that the polynomial matrix V [x] is in fact a submatrix
of a a× b polynomial matrix B[x] = (bij) defined by
bij =
{
0 if cij = 0
xij if cij = 1
where again the xij’s are indeterminates. Let all the non-zero
entries of B[x] follow i.i.d. uniform distribution on Fq , and
by the union bound, we have
Pr
{ ⋃
U∈U
det(V [x]) 6= 0
}
≥ 1−
∑
U∈U
Pr{det(V [x]) = 0}
≥ 1− |U|ab
q
Therefore if q > |U|ab, there exists an evaluation of B[x]
such that det(V [x]) 6= 0 for any U ∈ U . This evaluation
gives a desired C¯, because for any U ∈ U , the corresponding
submatrix U¯ of C¯ contains a full rank square submatrix of
size rU , and by definition rU is the maximum rank U¯ can
achieve subject to the zero constraints in C.
Define
C =
(
Cb→f
Iy
)
,
where Iy is the identity matrix of order y. Notice that rows in
C correspond to edges crossing the cut in G. Denote AV =
{A ∩ (EfwdV ∪ EbwdV ) : A ∈ A}. For A ∈ AV , denote UA the
submatrix of C formed by the rows corresponding to edges in
A. Let U = {UA, A ∈ AV }, and let C¯ be the rank maximized
matrix specified in Lemma 1 with respect to C and U . For
UA ∈ U , let U¯A be the corresponding submatrix of C¯. We are
now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity is bounded by
C ≤ x+ min
A∈AV
rank(U¯A)− |A|
In the special case of uniform wiretap sets, i.e., A = {A ⊂
E : |A| ≤ z}, Theorem 1 reduces to the following form.
Corollary 1. Define kb = min{U¯ : z × y submatrix of C¯} rank(U¯),
then the secrecy capacity is bounded by
C ≤ x+ kb − z
In what follows, we will prove Theorem 1. Given a cut
of x forward edges, y backward edges, and the connectivity
matrix Cb→f , we construct an upper bounding network G¯
as follows: 1) Absorb all nodes downstream the cut, i.e.,
all v ∈ V c, into the sink D. So for all i, j, head(efwdi )=D,
tail(ebwdj )=D. 2) Connect the source to each forward edge
with infinite unit capacity edges (S, tail(efwdi )). 3) Connect
the backward edges to the forward edges according to Cb→f .
More precisely, add an infinite amount of unit capacity edges
(head(ebwdj ), tail(e
fwd
i )) if and only if c
′
ij = 1. Finally, in G¯ we
only allow S and D to generate independent randomness.
Lemma 2. The secure unicast capacity of G¯ upperbounds the
secure unicast capacity of G.
Proof Sketch: Note that all infinite parallel unit capacity
edges are perfectly secure because they can be protected by an
infinite number of local keys. Hence for any coding scheme
on G, the same coding scheme can be simulated on G¯ securely.
The assumption that only S and D can generate randomness
is optimal, because if any other node wishes to generate
independent randomness, such randomness may be generated
at S and sent to the node through the infinite parallel edges.
Due to the fact that G¯ has a simplified structure, in the
proof of Theorem 1 we shall always consider G¯ instead of
G unless otherwise specified. Note that in G¯ only the edges
crossing the cut V are vulnerable, hence we may assume any
wiretap set only contains these edges. Therefore A = AV
and for notational convenience in what follows we no longer
distinguish them. Let F1, ..., Fx be the signals transmitted on
edges efwd1 , ..., e
fwd
x ; B1, ..., By be the signals transmitted on
edges ebwd1 , ..., e
bwd
y . Consider any A ∈ A and the set of signals
fA = {∪fe : e ∈ A} defined as follows.
fe =
{ {Bj} if e = ebwdj
{Bj : c′ij = 1} if e = efwdi
The following lemma shows that the rank structure of the
submatrices of C¯ has interesting properties.
Lemma 3. For any A ∈ A, there exists a partition A =
A1 ∪A2, such that |fA1 |+ |A2| = rank(U¯A).
Proof: The idea of the proof is to infer the structure of UA
given the rank of U¯A and the fact that U¯A is rank maximized.
Then since UA characterizes the connectivity to the edges in
A it becomes convenient to bound the size of fA.
Denote for short r = rank(U¯A), so U¯A contain an r ×
r submatrix whose determinant is non-zero, and therefore in
U¯A there exist r non-zero entries at different columns and at
different rows. Recall that an entry in U¯A can be non-zero only
if this entry is 1 in UA, hence UA contains r entries of value 1
at different columns and different rows. Perform column and
row permutations to move these 1’s such that UA(r+1−i, i) =
1,∀1 ≤ i ≤ r, i.e., they become the counter-diagonal entries of
the upper-left block formed by the first r× r entries. See Fig.
2 for an example. Note that permutations in UA are merely
reordering of edges, and for notational convenience we denote
the matrix after permutations as UA still.
It then follows that UA(i, j) = 0,∀r < i ≤ |A|, r < j ≤ y.
Otherwise if any entry in this lower right block is non-zero,
setting this and the aforementioned r counter-diagonal entries
as 1, and all other entries as 0 yields a matrix that satisfies
the zero constraint in UA and it has rank r + 1. But this is
a contradiction because r = rank(U¯A) is the maximum rank.
Hence we label this block as zero.
Below we introduce an algorithm that further permutes UA
and labels it blockwise. The algorithm takes a matrix G of
arbitrary size m × n and a positive integer parameter k as
input, such that the upper-left block GUL formed by the first
k × k entries of G has all 1’s in its counter-diagonal. Now
consider GLL = (gij), k < i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ k which is the
lower-left block of G. If every column of GLL is non-zero,
label this block as non-zero, label GUL as counter-diagonal,
label the block GUR = (gij), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, k < j ≤ n as
zero*, return t := 0 and terminate. If GLL = 0 or GLL is
empty, label this block (if not empty) as zero, label GUL as
counter-diagonal, label GUR as arbitrary, return t := k and
terminate.
Otherwise GLL contains both zero and non-zero columns.
In this case, first perform column permutations in G to move
all non-zero columns of GLL to the left and zero columns to
the right. Assume that after permutation the first u columns
of GLL are non-zero, and the last v columns are all zero.
Label the block (gij), k < i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ u as non-zero
and label the block (gij), k < i ≤ m,u < j ≤ k as zero. At
this point some of the 1’s originally in the counter-diagonal of
GUL are misplaced due to column permutations, perform row
permutations to move them back to the counter-diagonal. Note
that only the first k rows need to be permuted and the lower
labeled block(s) is not affected. Label the block (gij), k−u+
1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ u as counter-diagonal, label the block
(gij), 1 ≤ i ≤ k − u, 1 ≤ j ≤ u as arbitrary, and label the
block (gij), k − u + 1 ≤ i ≤ k, k < j ≤ n as zero*. Then
truncate the first u columns and the last m− k rows from G.
Notice that the block formed by the first v × v entries in the
truncated G has all 1’s in its counter-diagonal. Now invoke the
algorithm recursively to the truncated G with parameter v < k.
The algorithm must terminate because the input parameter is
a positive finite integer and cannot decrease indefinitely.
Applying the algorithm to the matrix UA with parameter
k := r will permute the rows and columns of UA and label it
completely. Refer to Figure 2 for an example. Notice that the
algorithm always labels counter-diagonal, non-zero and zero
literally, i.e., by hypothesis all counter-diagonal-label blocks
are square and have 1’s in their counter-diagonals (but the off-
counter-diagonal entries may be arbitrary); all non-zero-label
blocks do not contain zero columns; and all zero-label blocks
are all zero. The only non-trivial label is zero*, and we claim
that the algorithm also labels zero* correctly in the sense that
a zero*-labeled block is indeed zero.
To prove the claim, notice that all zero* blocks pile up at
the last y − r columns of UA, and consider any entry α1 of
a zero* block. By the algorithm the row of α1 must intersect
a unique counter-diagonal block, and denote the intersecting
counter-diagonal entry of the counter-diagonal block as β1. By
the algorithm this intersecting counter-diagonal block must
lie immediately on top of a non-zero block. Therefore the
lower non-zero block contains a non-zero entry α2 in the
same column as β1. And again the row of α2 will intersect
a counter-diagonal entry β2 of a counter-diagonal block. In
exactly the same way we are able to find a sequence of entries
Fig. 2: An example of a labeled UA. zero blocks are indicated
by 0; zero* blocks are indicated by 0*; counter-diagonal
blocks are indicated by I ′; non-zero blocks are colored in gray
and arbitrary blocks are crossed. The algorithm terminates
in four iterations and returns t. Key parameters of the first
two iterations are illustrated and the subscripts denote iteration
numbers. The truncated G after the first iteration is highlighted
in bold line. Note that the first t rows correspond to A2, and
the remaining rows correspond to A1.
α3, β3, α4, β4... until we reach the lowest non-zero block. Note
that all these entries belong to distinct blocks, and because
there is a finite number of blocks, the series is finite. In
particular, let w be the number of counter-diagonal blocks
that lie below or intersect the row of α1, then we can find
β1, ..., βw and α1, ..., αw+1, where αw+1 lies in the lowest
non-zero block. Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that
α1 is non-zero, set α1, ..., αw+1 to 1, set all counter-diagonal
entries of all counter-diagonal blocks except β1, ..., βw to 1,
and set all other entries to 0. This produces a matrix of rank
r + 1 because all r + 1 1’s appears in distinct columns and
rows, which contradicts the fact that U¯A is rank maximized.
Hence all zero*-label blocks are indeed zero. In particular,
after the permutations, the block UA(i, j), t < i ≤ |A|, r− t+
1 ≤ j ≤ y is all zero. Now partition A into A1∪A2, where A2
is the subset of edges corresponding to the first t rows of the
permuted UA. So |A2| = t and |A1| = |A| − t. But the zero
constraints in UA imply that fA1 contains r − t of the Bj’s
corresponding to the first r− t columns, hence |fA1 | = r− t.
Finally |fA1 |+ |A2| = r.
Corollary 2. Partition A into A1∪A2 as in Lemma 3. Further
partition A1 as AF ∪AB , where AF ⊂ {efwd1 , ..., efwdx }, AB ⊂
{ebwd1 , ..., ebwdy }, then H(fAF |fAB ) ≤ rank(U¯A)−|AB |−|A2|.
Proof: Suppose for contradiction that H(fAF |fAB ) >
rank(U¯A)− |AB | − |A2|, then |fAF \fAB | ≥ H(fAF \fAB ) ≥
H(fAF |fAB ) > rank(U¯A)−|AB |−|A2|. This implies |fA1 | >
rank(U¯A)− |A2|, a contradiction to Lemma 3.
Due to the cyclic nature of G′, imposing delay constraints
on some edges is necessary to avoid stability and causality
issues. It suffices to assume there is unit delay on edges
efwd1 , ..., e
fwd
x , e
bwd
1 , ..., e
bwd
y . Note that any realistic systems
should comply with these minimal delay constraints, e.g., it
is not possible that a forward signal Fi is a causal output
depending on a backward signal Bj , while Bj is also a causal
output depending on Fi. Let t be a time index, denote Fi[t]
and Bj [t] as the signals transmitted on edges efwdi and e
bwd
j
during the t-th time step. Consider an arbitrary secure coding
scheme that finishes within T time steps. Below we show that
the rate of this code is upper bounded by x+ rank(U¯A)−|A|,
∀A ∈ A, as claimed in Theorem 1. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider arbitrary random variables X,Y, Z,W ,
if (Z,W )→ (Y,W )→ X , then
H(X|Z,W ) ≥ H(X|W )− I(Y ;X|W )
Proof: Note that H(X,Y |W ) = H(X|Y,W ) +
H(Y |W ) = H(Y |X,W ) + H(X|W ). So H(X|Y,W ) =
H(X|W ) + H(Y |X,W ) − H(Y |W ) = H(X|W ) −
I(Y ;X|W ). Finally because H(X|Z,W ) ≥ H(X|Y,W ), we
prove the claim.
Proof (of Theorem 1): Define F [t] = {F1[t], ..., Fx[t]} as
all the forward signals at time t, and B[t] = {B1[t], ..., By[t]}
as all the backward signals. Let F = {F [1], ...,F [T ]}, B =
{B[1], ...,B[T ]}. Consider any A ∈ A, partition it into A1 +
A2 as in Lemma 3 and partition A1 into AF + AB as in
Corollary 2. Let FA[t] = {Fi[t] : efwdi ∈ AF } denote the
signals transmitted on AF at time t, and likewise let BA[t] =
{Bj [t] : ebwdj ∈ AB}. Let a = |AF |, b = |AB |, c = |A2|.
Recall that fAF [t] are the signals sent by all backward edges
to the edges in AF at time t, M is the source message, and
KD is all randomness generated by the sink. Now we upper
bound the message rate Rs. It follows,
TRs = H(M)
(a)
= H(M |KD)−H(M |F ,B,KD)
= I(M ;F ,B|KD)
= H(F ,B|KD)−H(F ,B|M,KD), (1)
where (a) is due to the decoding constraint and the fact that
KD is independent from M . We first study the first term in
(1). Expand it according to the chain rule, we have
H(F ,B|KD) = H(F [1], ...,F [T ],B[1], ...,B[T ]|KD)
(b)
=
T∑
i=1
H(F [i],B[i]|F [0...i− 1],B[0...i− 1],KD)
(c)
=
T∑
i=1
H(F [i]|F [0...i− 1],B[0...i− 1],KD)
(d)
≤
T∑
i=1
H(F [i]\FA[i]|F [0...i− 1],B[0...i− 1],KD)
+H(FA[i]|F [0...i− 1],B[0...i− 1],KD)
(e)
≤ T (x− a) +
T∑
i=1
H(FA[i]|FA[0...i− 1], BA[0...i− 1])
(f)
= T (x− a) +
T∑
i=1
H(FA[i]|FA[0...i− 1], BA[0...i− 1],M)
(2)
Here (b) follows from the chain rule; (c) follows from the fact
that B[i] is a function of the conditions; (d) follows from the
chain rule and conditioning reduces entropy; (e) follows from
conditioning reduces entropy; and (f) follows from the secrecy
constraint, i.e., M is independent from FA[0...T ], BA[0...T ].
Next we deal with the second term in (1).
H(F ,B|M,KD) ≥ H(FA[1...T ], BA[1...T ]|M,KD)
=
T∑
i=1
H(FA[i], BA[i]|FA[0...i− 1], BA[0...i− 1],M,KD)
≥
T∑
i=1
H(FA[i]|FA[0...i− 1], BA[0...i− 1],M,KD)
(g)
≥
T∑
i=1
H(FA[i]|FA[0...i− 1], BA[0...i− 1],M) (3)
− I(fAF [0...i− 1];FA[i]|FA[0...i− 1], BA[0...i− 1],M)
Where (g) is due to Lemma 4 by regarding FA[i] as X;
fAF [0, ..., i − 1] as Y ; KD as Z; and M,FA[0, ..., i −
1], BA[0, ..., i − 1] as W . Note that indeed FA[i] learns
everything it can about KD from fAF [0, ..., i − 1]. Plug (2)
and (3) into (1) yields,
TRs ≤ T (x− a)
+
T−1∑
i=1
I(fAF [1...i];FA[i+ 1]|FA[1...i], BA[1...i],M) (4)
Finally we bound the mutual information terms that appear
in (4). These terms characterize how the sink generated
keys at times 1, ..., i contribute to randomizing (and therefore
protecting) the forward signals transmitted at time i+ 1.
T−1∑
j=1
I(fAF [1...j];FA[j + 1]|FA[1...j], BA[1...j],M)
(h)
=
T−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
I(fAF [i];FA[j + 1]|FA[1...j],
BA[1...j], fAF [0...i− 1],M)
(i)
=
T−1∑
i=1
T−1∑
j=i
I(fAF [i];FA[j + 1]|FA[1...j],
BA[1...j], fAF [0...i− 1],M)
(j)
≤
T−1∑
i=1
I(fAF [i];FA[i+ 1]|FA[1...i], BA[1...i], fAF [0...i− 1],M)
+
T−2∑
i=1
T−1∑
j=i+1
I(fAF [i];FA[j + 1], BA[j]
|FA[1...j], BA[1...j − 1], fAF [0...i− 1],M)
(k)
=
T−1∑
i=1
I(fAF [i];FA[i+ 1...T ], BA[i+ 1...T − 1]
|FA[1...i], BA[1...i], fAF [0...i− 1],M)
(l)
≤
T−1∑
i=1
H(fAF [i]|BA[i])
(m)
≤ (T − 1)(rank(U¯A)− b− c) (5)
Here (h) follows from the chain rule for mutual information;
(i) follows from changing the order of summation; (j) follows
from the fact that I(X;Y |Z) ≤ I(X;Y,Z); (k) follows from
the chain rule for mutual information; (l) follows from the
definition of mutual information and conditioning reduces
entropy; and (m) follows from Corollary 2. Finally substitute
(5) into (4) we have
RS ≤ T (x− a+ rank(U¯A)− b− c)− rank(U¯A) + b+ c
T
=
T (x+ rank(U¯A)− |A|)− rank(U¯A) + b+ c
T
< x+ rank(U¯A)− |A|
IV. ACHIEVABILITY
In this section we construct a scalar linear code that achieves
the upper bound of Theorem 1 in G¯, thereby finding the secrecy
capacity of G¯. The achievability result also implies that the
upper bound is optimal if one only looks at the cut and its
connectivity matrix. We will build the code on top of C¯, with
the idea that C¯ is rank maximized and therefore suggests an
“optimal” way of using the backward keys (i.e., sink generated
randomness) to provide maximum randomization and protec-
tion. Hence what remains to be designed is the forward keys
(source generated randomness that is independent from the
message), and it turns out that kf = maxA∈A |A| − rank(U¯A)
units of forward keys are sufficient in G¯. Therefore a rate of
Rs = x−kf = x+ minA∈A rank(U¯A)−|A| can be achieved.
For the ease of presentation we start with the assumption
that there is no delay in G¯, and will construct a code that
achieves capacity exactly. We will show later that extending
this code to networks with delay is straightforward, and in this
case it achieves capacity asymptotically.
Let m1, ...,mRs be the messages, K
1
S , ...,K
kf
S be the source
generated keys, K1D, ...,K
y
D be the sink generated keys, all of
them are i.i.d. uniformly distributed in Fq . Let E = (eij) ∈
F(x+y)×(x+y)q be the encoding matrix, defined by
E =
(
G
0
C¯
)
, (6)
where G is a random matrix of size x × x with entries i.i.d.
uniformly chosen from Fq , and 0 is a zero matrix of size y×x.
Then the signals transmitted on the cut is

F1
...
Fx
B1
...
By

= E

m1
...
mRs
K1S
...
K
kf
S
K1D
...
KyD

Notice that E is a full rank square matrix with high probability
since G is generic and the bottom y rows of C¯ are linearly
independent. Therefore the sink D can decode everything. We
only need to show the code is secure, i.e., any z-subset of
{F1, ..., Fx, B1, ..., By} is independent from {m1, ...,mRs}.
Since linearly independence implies independence, it suffices
to show that the row space of
EMessage = (IRs | 0Rs×(kf+y))
and the row space of any EA, A ∈ A intersect trivially,
where EA is the submatrix of E formed by the rows that
correspond to the edges in A. Let Er be the submatrix of
E by deleting the first Rs columns from E, then it suffices
to show any submatrix ErA, A ∈ A has full row rank. The
following theorem shows this is true when q is sufficiently
large.
Theorem 2. The code E is secure with probability at least
1− |A|kf (x+y)q .
Proof: As mentioned above it suffices to show that any
ErA, A ∈ A has full row rank. Consider an arbitrary ErA, and
notice that the last y columns of it is exactly U¯A. Assume that
the A contains a forward edges and b backward edges. Then
due to the structure of C¯, the last b rows of U¯A must be linearly
independent. There exist rank(U¯A)− b rows among the first a
rows such that these rows and the last b rows together form a
basis of the row space of U¯A. The remaining |A| − rank(U¯A)
rows of U¯A, all of them correspond to forward edges, are in the
linear span of this basis. Assuming without loss of generality
that they are the first |A| − rank(U¯A) rows (otherwise reorder
the forward edges), we construct a matrix E+A as
E+A =
(
I|A|−rank(U¯A)
0
U¯A
)
Notice that kf = maxA′∈A |A′|−rank(U¯ ′A) ≥ |A|−rank(U¯A),
so the number of columns in E+A is not larger than the number
of columns in ErA. We append kf + rank(U¯A)−|A| more zero
columns to the left of E+A to obtain a matrix E
++
A which is
of the same size as ErA. Note that E
++
A has full row rank
and satisfies the zero block constraint as defined in (6). Hence
E++A contains a |A| × |A| full rank submatrix, denoted by
EA. Consider the polynomial matrix EA[x] as a submartix of
ErA by regarding all random entries in E
r
A as indeterminates,
then it follows that det(EA[x]) is not the zero polynomial
because det(EA) 6= 0. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, under
the random selection of entries in ErA,
Pr {det(EA[x]) = 0} ≤
kf |A|
q
Finally by the union bound,
Pr
{ ⋃
A∈A
det(EA[x]) 6= 0
}
≥ 1−
∑
A∈A
Pr{det(EA[x]) = 0}
≥ 1− |A|kf (x+ y)
q
Extending the above code to networks with delay is straight-
forward. It suffices for the source to wait one time slot for the
arrival of the first batch of keys, and then start transmitting
normally. So the overhead is vanishing as we increase the time
duration of the code.
V. CONCLUSION
We consider the problem of secure communication over
a network in the presence of wiretappers. We gives a cut-
set bound of secrecy capacity which takes into account the
network connectivity and the contribution of backward edges.
We show the bound is tight on a class of networks. One
interesting problem that future works may study is to improve
the cut-set bound with more network characteristics, such as
the min cut from backward edges to forward edges, which
may quantify any bottlenecks in the use of backward edges.
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